



GLOBE RISK INTERNATIONAL INC.

Threat, Risk, Vulnerability Assessment
Of
The Security Environment in
Barbados

Presented to

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Section One PROJECT OVERVIEW

1.0 Introduction

A Canadian legal team will be travelling to Barbados to conduct cross-examination and later examinations for discovery in conjunction with a legal matter before the Canadian courts involving several citizens of Barbados. The purpose of this threat assessment was to identify physical security vulnerabilities at three pre-determined locations, that may affect the team and ascertain associated procedures and solutions that may be required to counter those vulnerabilities. A physical security review was conducted to identify security procedures required to support the legal team while in Barbados.

The comments made throughout this report are forward looking and have been based on the experiences of the consultant and information obtained and learned while visiting Barbados. All comments are for consideration and discussion and are not based necessarily on what will happen.

1.1 Executive Summary

In September 2007, Crawford, McKenzie, McLean, Anderson and Duncan LLP, Barristers and Solicitors engaged Globe Risk International Inc. (GRI) to complete a Threat, Risk, Vulnerability Assessment (TRVA) of the security vulnerabilities associated with the travel of a Canadian legal team to Barbados. As part of this engagement, GRI performed a TRVA and physical security review of all identified locations, including venues for both accommodation and legal offices that could be utilized by the legal team. This report summarizes the findings of a TRVA that took place in Barbados between October 10- October 14, 2007.

A TRVA was performed to determine the legal team's risk profile and to assess potential or anticipated threats that could be directed against them while in Barbados or to their families residing in Canada. The information within this report has been compiled from a series of physical security reviews and observations, through research and interviews with local sources with knowledge of the current political and security situation in Barbados.

The assessment included the examination of the following risk categories; ability to conduct legal proceedings without external interference, accommodation and environmental security issues, international and domestic travel, access control to the legal team, physical protection of the legal team and other security related hazards as identified during the review.

Within each of the risk categories, current controls and safeguards have been identified, their effectiveness evaluated and where appropriate, recommendations provided. The key findings and recommendations are summarized in Section 2 of this report.

The legal team expressed concern over physical, political and environmental risks and vulnerabilities that may affect their safety. Extensive research was necessary, as the assessment review had to be completed without the direct knowledge of the government or any of its agencies. The high profile of several of the defendants precluded a traditional approach to this engagement, which would normally have involved interviews with government, police and other pertinent agencies in the consulting process. As such, the consultant worked independently to identify vulnerabilities that could affect the safety of the legal team.

The key findings of this report indicated that:

- It would not have been possible to quantify the statements made in this report without having conducted an in-country risk assessment.
- At this time, the vulnerability of the legal team from external hostile agents is assessed as high.
- This legal action is high profile and the legal team should consider themselves to be potentially at risk both within Canada and particularly while deployed in Barbados.
- The connection of some defendants to government and police services may jeopardize or render unreliable the usual systems in place to protect visitors to Barbados.
- In the absence of a well-trained, professional security team, it would be difficult to provide the necessary level of protection and effective response to any event or crisis incurred by the legal team.
- It is anticipated that the threat level will increase significantly as the legal action proceeds.
- The interest of domestic and international media will heighten the public profile of the team and may expose them to an increased threat from criminal and/or hostile agents.
- Direct and indirect threats have already been delivered to one member of the legal team raising serious concerns about personal security and that of the extended family.
- A member of the legal team has already been both directly and indirectly threatened and as such there are serious concerns regarding legal team personal security and that of their families.
- Current crime trends within Barbados indicate that the vulnerability of the legal team operating in an insecure security environment could become a major concern, particularly with the number of criminal assaults and drug dealing activities.

All venues being considered for examinations for discovery hearings are poorly protected with no immediate police assistance readily available, and are situated considerable distances from the Hilton Hotel. If extensive amounts of driving are necessary, security trained drivers will have to be utilized to ensure the legal team's safety and security while driving.

It is unlikely that any local security company will be capable of providing the levels of response required to mitigate any number of possible events that may occur and impact on the legal team. A security program that identifies major and minor security situations that could develop in the short and long-term protection of the legal team should be prepared with high priority.

At this time, the safety and security of the legal team while conducting examinations in Barbados has been rated as "Unsatisfactory", given the profile of a number of the defendants being examined.

1.2 Scope of the Engagement

The scope of the engagement involved the review of the legal team's accommodations and discovery office environment to ascertain the security measures required to ensure their safety and security while in Barbados.

A physical security review was performed of specified locations to determine risk profiles and physical threats to the legal team while conducting their work. The information and observations within this report are the result of a visit to Barbados and a review of these locations.

The scope of the TRVA included:

- A physical review of the legal team's intended accommodations;
- A physical review of the legal team's examination for discovery office environment;
- A physical review of the law courts and surrounding areas;
- Local research at the Bridgetown library;
- A review of the legal team's travel requirements during their stay in Barbados;
- Identifying in-country security resources to support the legal team's security requirements;
- Review of the legal team's evacuation options;
- Meetings with consular staff at the Canadian High Commission;
- Assessment of the present security situation and associated problems in Barbados;
- Meetings with a Canadian financial firm to discuss the present business climate;
- Determining the capability of the Barbados police to respond and protect the legal team;
- Determining the present security awareness of the population.

1.3 Objectives

The TRVA is a high-level review of the potential vulnerabilities and threats to the legal team.

The objectives of the TRVA are to:

- Assess all potential threats and vulnerabilities;
- Determine vulnerabilities faced by the legal team both domestically and internationally;
- Assess any immediate threats against the legal team;
- Identify risks and vulnerabilities to the legal team's business, private and social activities while in Barbados;
- Ensure that security controls can be developed for the protection of the legal team;
- Assess risks and vulnerabilities to the safety and security of the legal team by examining current Barbadian security practices and protocols;
- Determine if current Barbadian security procedures and practices are consistent with identified risks and international best practices;
- Identify security manpower requirements to ensure the safety of the legal team through all identified risk levels; and
- Provide recommendations to ensure that security planning procedures and practices will mitigate any identified risks against the legal team.

1.4 Methodology

In conducting a TRVA, key areas of potential risk are examined and recommendations made based on good security and safety practices and the experience of the consultant.

The general areas assessed in this review include the following:

- Personal Security of the Legal Team;
- Accommodation Security and Protection;
- Legal Team Office Access Control Systems;
- Legal Team Security Vulnerabilities;
- Legal Team Security Plan Design and Integration;
- Legal Team Security Coverage;
- International and Domestic Travel.

1.5 Approach

The TRVA study focused on three steps that reflect a systematic and disciplined approach to satisfying the legal team's objectives and requirements. This approach enables the consultant to gain an understanding of the safety and security procedures, processes and practices, and the environment within which they have been implemented.

This analysis is a high-level, but comprehensive identification and appraisal of key safety and security factors that could conceivably have an adverse impact on the legal team. In addition, future security manpower requirements were reviewed.

1.6 Phase 1 - Identify Current Controls and Safeguards

Information was collected and current practices identified through the following steps:

- A review of the legal team's primary accommodations and discovery office operations;
- Interviews with the Canadian High Commission to ascertain the Canadian government's responsibilities for supporting the legal team's activities while in Barbados;
- A review of all relevant documentation regarding past activities of the Barbadian government and agencies;
- A review of all relevant documentation regarding past activities of the defendants;
- Meetings with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Caribbean Security Liaison Officer;
- A review of security manpower requirements should the deployment of an external security team be required to support the legal team's safety and security in the event of an increased level of threat.

1.7 Phase 2 - Evaluate the Effectiveness of Controls and Safeguards

Possible security and safety exposures to the legal team were identified. Based on the consultant's knowledge and experience, the current level of physical protection does not meet the basic requirements for a Canadian legal team being deployed to Barbados to conduct examinations for discovery.

1.8 Phase 3 – Prepare the Report

A draft report will be prepared for review. Once reviewed by lead counsel, the final report will be completed and presented.

1.9 Provide Recommendations

Recommendations have been made to reduce the impact and likelihood of identified security risks and threats. These include:

- Controls to inhibit impact threats, preventive controls;
- Controls to compensate for impact of threats, reactive controls; and
- Advice on feasible, cost-effective security measures required to prevent/reduce security-related risks and threats to the legal team.

The recommendations have been categorized as follows to reflect the importance and suggested timelines for implementation.

- Critical - Significant liability or risk exists which should be addressed immediately.
- Essential - Liability or risk exists which should be addressed as soon as possible.
- Important - Liability or risk exists which should be addressed in the normal course of events.

Section 2 – THREAT, RISK, VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

2.0 Introduction

Conducting business in countries with nepotistic government control can be difficult and challenging. The protection of individuals from the local environment is sometimes a challenge and the question of what can be done to deter or prevent a security incident from occurring is sometimes difficult to answer. Unfortunately, it often requires a major situation to arouse concern sufficiently to mobilize the will to take needed action. Useful things are often accomplished in the shadow of tragedy.

The protection of a Canadian legal team in Barbados while it goes about its business would usually be the responsibility of the host government and its law enforcement agencies. Due to current circumstances, this might not be possible. This is not necessarily because those charged with providing security are unable to provide support from potential hostile agents, but because the position and power of a number of the defendants involved may influence circumstances.

People seldom support costly and potentially disruptive measures to protect against things that have not occurred. Yet, it is a possibility that hostile agents could be hired to intimidate or assault individuals who pose a threat to a person or persons unknown. It is impossible to know when, where and how attacks may be initiated, so given the present situation, it is important that security is proactive, protecting the legal team from hostile agents who show a proclivity to attack or intimidate.

Could the Canadian legal team be at risk while conducting examinations for discovery in Barbados? Given current information and under existing circumstances, yes, particularly as overt threats have already been made both directly and indirectly against legal counsel. This further underlines the need for planned, proactive security measures to increase the personal safety and security of the legal team. Effective security renders potential hostile agent attacks more difficult, can increase their likelihood of being detected, can minimize casualties and disruption, can reduce stress and can reassure the legal team.

Analyses of previous attacks and campaigns against individuals who pose a threat to governments and high-profile individuals have provided a growing catalogue of lessons learned and best security practices. These include measures intended to deter or prevent attacks, assist in detection and diagnosis, and mitigate casualties and disruption through design and preparedness. A visible security presence and an alert security team will have a major deterrent effect. Detection and diagnosis are essential to both keeping the legal team out of harm's way and minimizing needless personal stress and disruption of the legal process. Any hostile agent detection must be coupled with a rapid-response.

Designing a comprehensive security plan to address the legal team's accommodations and conference space to conduct discovery examinations should be completed as soon as possible.

The power, authority and influence of some of the defendants over agencies providing protection in Barbados implies the means to exploit the legal team and the discovery process via the introduction of hostile agents or government agencies through:

- Intimidation
- Physical assault
- Kidnapping

- Murder
- Threats to legal team/family
- Sabotage of the legal process
- Theft of legal documentation
- Theft of laptop computers
- Undermining of the legal team's credibility through the planting of illegal substances in hotel rooms, conference rooms, vehicles or persons
- Extortion

Hostile agents can be encouraged to intimidate either financially, under threats of arrest, or incarceration or other unknown pressures. This scenario remains a possibility during the course of the lawsuit. Many of these threats are very real, and should not be discounted.

The principle of the Threat, Risk, Vulnerability Assessment (TRVA) is to assess the business process in light of the safety and security environment and to identify vulnerabilities and risks to the legal team, prioritizing response actions. In most cases, a qualitative assessment based on subjective experience is adequate for the assessment; however, in potentially high-risk situations, a more rigorous quantitative process is required.

There are no universally accepted standards for the evaluation of a threat or risk event, as every circumstance differs somewhat in scope, size and threat level. Individual security requirements are invariably dissimilar. Moreover, the need for protection from one set of circumstances to another can vary, sometimes considerably. Therefore, the security risk must first be qualified for the determination of an accurate assessment to be made. This is accomplished through the application of risk analysis: a process that determines the level of threat that any program may have to defeat or otherwise contend with. In turn, this analysis considers the cost/benefit value of addressing certain types of threats that may require significant expenditures. The risk analysis process is quite complex and can often be the subject of a specific review.

The consultant performed a risk analysis assessment, to more accurately define the appropriate level of risk and the security needed for the protection of the legal team, including several pre-identified legal office areas. Meetings were conducted with a number of individuals with local knowledge in Barbados who revealed a list of specific security incident types that a future security program should be prepared to handle. It should be noted that time, location and circumstances will influence the likelihood of a threat from any particular area.

While the legal team's senior lawyers displayed a thorough understanding with respect to the need for planning for security events or future acts of violence, there is very little they can do at this stage. If an attack were mounted against the legal team within Barbados at this time, prevention and response would be totally ineffective.

This threat assessment review has been completed to ensure that all potential security events that could impact on the legal team's activities while in Barbados have been identified and planned for. It has been clearly identified that the potential for a security related incident is a distinct possibility. It is obvious to assume that any form of intimidation or attack against the legal team would cause considerable harm to the ongoing legal action, as at this time, the legal team will be required to travel to Barbados to conduct discovery examinations.

In terms of exposure and vulnerability, the legal team would be an obvious target because of the ease with which they could be intimidated, threatened, assaulted, kidnapped or murdered. For ease of movement the legal team will need to be located close to the centre of Bridgetown.

Once potential threats and adversaries are identified, the two must be correlated to establish what is known as a "specific design-reference" threat analysis. This process begins by comparing the most credible threats with the most likely potential adversaries and then again with the most capable adversaries. This allows for the "worst-case" scenario and promotes the need for a corresponding maximum level of protection.

Although the consultant did not undertake to complete a thorough and exhaustive "design-reference" threat analysis, specifically because he was unable to speak with the government or any of its agencies, he was able to identify vulnerabilities and make recommendations for a future security program that would be designed to impede, detect and assess unauthorized external and internal activity from impacting on the safety and security of the legal team's activities.

Due to the legal circumstances surrounding this action, the consultant has anticipated that there will be no security support provided by the Barbadian government or any of its agencies and, as such, the legal team must rely on their own security resources.

The security team should be capable of responding to a high threat event at a moment's notice. This is achieved by designing programs that, by industry definition, include:

- Restricted general access to the legal team, to include:
 - placing all entrances and exits to the legal team under security control
 - establishing controls designed to restrict access to sensitive areas (accommodations, and discovery offices), except by authorized individuals
- Deployment of a trained security team to respond to all "special risks"
- Legal team security awareness training
- On-going liaison with Canadian High Commission consulate staff in Barbados

All facets of security in Barbados are managed or controlled by a number of the defendants or their distant relatives. This could result in a conflict of interest by government agencies that should be providing support and response to any attempted criminal activities directed against the legal team. As impartial assistance and protection cannot be assured, it is essential that the legal team develop its own security contingency plans that do not rely on the support and response efforts of the Barbadian government or its agencies.

2.1 Barbadian Government and Emergency Services

Barbadian Government and Emergency Services include:

- Barbadian Police Service
- Barbadian Defence Force
- Barbadian Customs
- Barbadian Immigration Services

It is anticipated that the legal team will not be treated the same as any other corporate business entity working within Barbados. There have been no specific plans developed to respond to

emergency or security related events for the legal team and only a minimum level of communication between the Canadian and Barbadian governments. Open communications would clarify the responsibilities and expectations of each government while the citizens of Canada undertake their work in Barbados. Canadian government involvement, whether direct from Ottawa or through the Canadian High Commission in Barbados may be necessary.

Recommendations

- Establish effective liaison and ongoing communication with both governments.
- Request police protection.
- Consider retaining the services of a Canadian based security company to plan and provide security for the legal team.

2.1.1 The Royal Barbados Police Force (RBPF)

The RBPF is responsible for law enforcement and is under the control of civilian authorities. The small Barbados Defence Force (BDF) maintains national security and may be called upon to maintain public order in times of crisis, emergency, or other specific need. Past reports have indicated that members of the RBPF have committed some human rights abuses. The Barbadian constitution specifically prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading punishment or other treatment. The majority of complaints against the RBPF alleged unprofessional conduct and beating or assault. It has been reported that a significant number of these complaints have not been resolved.

RBPF procedures provide that the police may question suspects and other persons they hold only at a police station, except when expressly permitted by a senior divisional officer. An officer must visit detainees at least once every 3 hours to inquire about the detainees' condition. After 24 hours, the detaining authority must submit a written report to the Deputy Commissioner. The authorities must approve and record all movements of detainees between stations. The authorities generally adhered to these basic principles, although there were occasional allegations that officials used excessive force. Canadian citizens have the right to call the Canadian High Commission.

The majority of the RBFP are unarmed, but firearms are issued to special foot patrols in high crime areas. The RBFP have an armed special rapid response unit, which continues to operate throughout the country. Aside from this exception, the RBFP is mostly unarmed, in keeping with its British traditions. Additionally, Barbadian law provides that the RBFP can request assistance from the BDF for specific projects. During these times, the RBPF and the BDF are known to conduct joint patrols.

2.1.2 Barbados Crime Statistics

Analysis of crime-related trends, patterns and statistics is a useful endeavour when developing or refining a security program. This information makes it possible to both forecast future security requirements and to assess the type of resources best deployed to address such needs. The consultant reviewed several security monthly summaries for purposes of determining site-specific crime patterns. The monthly reports indicate a minimal amount of criminal activity within the Bridgetown area. This is somewhat remarkable considering the proximity of the site to the downtown core, plus the increase in violent crime that has afflicted Bridgetown over the past few years.

The Royal Barbados Police Force prepares monthly summary reports on crimes against tourists. These reports are quite detailed and include the nature of the offense, the location where it was committed, the time of day, the number of victims by age, gender and nationality, the number of assailants, weapons used if any, estimated dollar value of what was stolen, and mode of entry into an apartment or hotel room. With the use of this data, it is possible to compile annual and monthly statistics on crimes against tourists.

Review Appendix F for more information.

2.1.3 Technical Surveillance Counter Measures Unit (TSCM)

RBFP have a significant capability to conduct TSCM surveillance and presently have three countermeasures teams within Barbados. There is no legal precedence within Barbados to prevent the tapping of phones or the interception of other electronic information in the country. It is believed that this unit's equipment and capability far exceeds anything that Canadian intelligence and law enforcement agencies currently have.

2.1.4 The Barbados Defence Force (BDF)

The BDF is the name given to the combined armed forces of Barbados. The BDF was established August 15th, 1979 and has responsibility for the territorial defence and internal security of Barbados.

There are three main components of the BDF:

- Force Headquarters - which provides administrative and logistical support for the entire BDF force.
- The Barbados Regiment - this is the mainland force component and encompasses both regular and reserve units.
- Barbados Coast Guard - this is the maritime element and has responsibility for patrolling Barbados' territorial waters, as well as drug interdiction and sea rescue.

The Barbados Regiment is stationed as part of the BDF headquarters at the "Garrison" which is located between the Grantley Adams International Airport and Bridgetown. The regiment today is divided into regular and reserve forces, essentially making up two 'battalions', though they are staffed as battalions. The regiment operate in a light infantry role.

Regular Forces - The regular force consists of three companies:

- Headquarters Company: This provides the logistic and administrative support for the entire regiment.
- Special Operations Company: This is the main fighting unit. Its primary task is to provide a quick reaction force, but it also works closely with both the Royal Barbados Police Force and with the Barbados Coast Guard in an anti-drug role.
- Technical Support Company: This provides the engineering and mechanical support.

Reserve Forces - Is the reserve element of the BDF that maintains the traditions of the old Barbados Regiment and is responsible for the Regiment's colours. The reserve element also consists of three companies:

- Headquarters Company (which includes the Band of the Barbados Regiment)
- Two Rifle Companies

Although the regiment's primary role is to defend Barbados, it also provides the country's commitment to UN peacekeeping forces, predominantly in the Caribbean region. The regiment also participated, along with the Jamaica Regiment and the Rifle Company Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force, in the US led invasion of Grenada in 1983.

2.1.5 Barbados Customs

It was recently reported that the head of Barbadian customs was discovered to have millions of US dollars in the Bridgetown CIBC Bank when his salary is \$55,000.00 per year.

2.1.6 Barbados Immigration

Discovery dates will be communicated in advance, thereby announcing the arrival of the Legal Team. Any one of the defendants could pressurize or encourage Barbados immigration to refuse entry or cause entry delays. While only a possibility, it should be recognized. If it is possible to arrange travel via private jet into a private airfield, this may help eliminate some entry concerns. This would be facilitated through the RCMP and in no way implies entering the country illegally.

2.1.7 Barbados Legal Issues

Court System - The Barbadian constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the government generally respects this provision in practice. The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, which consists of the High Court and Court of Appeal. The Governor General, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and after consultation with the leader of the opposition, appoints the Chief Justice and other judges. Judges serve until the age of 65.

The constitution also provides that persons charged with criminal offences be given a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court, and the government generally respects this right in practice. The judicial system provides for the right of due process at each level. The law presumes defendants innocent until proven guilty.

Detention System - The Barbadian Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and requires detainees to be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and the government generally respects these provisions in practice. Criminal defendants have the right to counsel, and attorneys have ready access to their clients.

Correction System - Prison conditions in Barbados remain poor and inadequate. A new prison is being built at this time by a US company (see Appendix D for more information).

2.2 Tourism and Crime in the Caribbean

As tourism has emerged as the major global industry, concerns over visitor safety have become paramount. Tourists, however, are much more likely to be victimized by crime than by terrorist activity. In the Caribbean, terrorism is negligible, and with the exception of the recent spate of bombings of tourist hotels globally, the major safety concern is crime against visitors, particularly violent crime.

Predatory crime against tourists usually requires three basic elements:

- a suitable victim or target
- a motivated offender, usually someone who has adopted a criminal lifestyle, and a relative absence of "capable guardians"
- inadequate training and deployment of law enforcement officers, security guards, to police tourist areas.

Canada and other countries issue travel advisories to their citizens planning on vacationing in Barbados.

2.3 Drug Trafficking

Presently, Barbados is seen as one of the transit countries for cocaine entering by sea from Colombia, Venezuela, and Guyana. Marijuana is brought in from St. Vincent and the Grenadines by private vessels. Most cocaine shipments entering Barbados and its territorial waters are destined for North America and Europe, although domestic cocaine consumption has been on the rise in recent years. Barbados may experience less maritime cocaine flow than its neighbouring islands due to its location east of the Lesser Antilles. Barbados is a hub for commercial air passenger couriers moving cocaine to Europe. Cruise lines and container vessels are also reported as means of cocaine transport.

2.4 The Threat, Risk, Vulnerability Assessment Process

The purpose of the TRVA is to assess the business process in light of the safety and security environment, identify vulnerabilities and risks to the organization and then to prioritize the necessary response actions.

2.5 Objectives

The TRVA is a high-level review of the major vulnerabilities and threats to the legal team's activities while deployed to Barbados.

The objectives of the TRVA is to:

- Identify security risks and vulnerabilities to the legal team's activities in Barbados;
- Assess risks and vulnerabilities to the legal team activities by examining the current security environment;
- Determine if current security practices are consistent with identified risks and best practices;
- Provide recommendations to address the shortfalls in order to mitigate identified risks.

2.6 Scope

The scope of the TRVA included the legal team's activities, accommodations, travelling and other locations as identified.

2.7 Methodology

In conducting a TRVA, key areas of the legal team's activities are examined and recommendations made based on good security and safety practices.

Security was reviewed to:

- Ensure that all potential situations relating to security and vulnerability of the legal team had been identified and addressed;
- Ensure that the scope of the security requirements needed to protect the Legal team activities had been addressed;
- Ensure the methods to develop and establish an effective TRVA report had been established and that the legal team had been provided with a realistic assessment of its present and future vulnerabilities;
- Ensure that the type of security programs needed to provide effective security response that would deter all potential security threats were being considered;
- Ensure that all risks and vulnerabilities to legal team activities had been examined;
- Ensure current security arrangements within Barbados were consistent with identified risks and best security practices.

Once deployed to Barbados, all areas of the legal team’s activities should be considered vulnerable to hostile agents, due to the ease with which the legal team’s security could be breached. To prevent any hostile agent interference with the legal team and process, effective security coverage will be required. Under normal circumstances, the Barbadian police would be expected to perform this function, but in this case, it is not likely. The Barbadian police could, in fact, become an unwitting part of the problem instead of the solution.

The legal team cannot expect the full cooperation of the Barbadian police or other government agencies because of the potential impact the legal action could have against prominent members of the government. The Barbadian economy may also feel the effects of this action, in the event that a judgement is awarded to the plaintiffs. The impact of the pending legal action is already an issue in Barbados and its successful conclusion could not only bring significant ramifications to the defendants and damage to the integrity of the sitting government, but could possibly result in the fall of the government overall.

The government of Barbados owes a duty of care to prevent and defend against attempts to disrupt the ongoing legal process and prevent acts of intimidation directed against the legal team. A more comprehensive review of defendants’ business and government connections should be completed by a private investigator prior to the deployment of the legal team. The following potential scenarios could potentially impact on legal team activities and should be considered:

- Direct attack - using firearms, physical assault, kidnapping, intimidation, sabotage or explosives to disrupt the legal teams activities;
- Stand off attack – using explosives or sabotage of vehicles;
- Bomb threat – using fear to disrupt legal team activities until a thorough search has been completed;
- Intimidation of legal team while in Barbados or in Canada;
- Planting of drugs or other illegal substances;
- Refusal to allow the legal and security team to enter the country;
- Threats to Legal team;
- Kidnapping of legal team members;

- Murder of legal team member;
- Acts of physical violence against the legal team;
- Intimidation of plaintiffs or witnesses;
- Bugging of discovery offices and legal team accommodations and meeting areas
- Technical interception of legal team communications
- Theft of legal team laptop computers cell phones, legal documentation etc.;
- Any combination of the above.

2.8 Threat Levels

Threat levels tend to be fluid and, as such, it is essential that any future security plan be specially tailored to meet any evolving threat levels. The security needs of the legal team and their families should be specifically designed to raise or lower as the level of threat increases or diminishes. It is very difficult to convince individuals that there is a possibility that their safety and that of their families could be jeopardized.

2.8.1 Defining Threat Levels

Threat levels will require to be planned for using three distinct levels:

- Threat Level One – daily business operations
- Threat Level Two – elevated threat
- Threat Level Three – clearly defined threat

Level One

Level one would be normal daily functions - discovery examinations.

- The legal team would conduct their discovery examinations;
- Normal access control procedures to the legal team’s accommodations and discovery space would be in place;
- Security protocols would be adhered to.

Level Two

Level two - the level of security is increased as a result of hostile agent activity or threats against the legal team (verbal or written).

- The security team would increase their coverage and vigilance and accompany the legal team to all meetings and lunch and dinner engagements;
- Legal team accommodation floor will be secured and all access will be via a security team member;
- Security will actively patrol the legal team floor 24/7.

Level Three

Level three is enacted when intelligence or actions clearly indicate a major threat is imminent, whereby the legal team is/could be a potential target or has received a credible threat against their lives.

- The legal team will be evacuated to a previously determined location and secured pending evacuation out of country. The entire legal team would be provided with close protection coverage 24/7 for the duration of the level three alert.

2.9 Threat Level Escalation

A threat escalation plan will need to be developed and should be designed with three premises:

- A closure or partial closure of examination for discovery proceedings; and communication to the Canadian High Commission advising of this action;
- Increased security coverage for the legal team;
- Immediate evacuation from Barbados.

This escalation plan would form part of a cornerstone set of security plans designed to accurately mirror the specific circumstances and vulnerabilities surrounding the legal team's activities.

2.10 Threat Types

The threat to the legal team could come from any one of four identifiable groups, namely:

- Internal – disgruntled or intimidated witness or plaintiff
- External – Interest groups hired/retained by defendants or other individuals
- Economic – intimidation of legal team and families
- Criminal – extortion, intimidation, robbery, gang and drug related activities, acts of vandalism or theft

2.10.1 Internal - The internal threat could emanate from an externally coerced, disgruntled or intimidated legal team member, witness or plaintiff. It is usually found in high stress and problematic situations. The external stressors (due to the enormity of the legal action) could also have a detrimental effect on some individuals. To date, the legal team has experienced a number of threats in this area. The overall level of internal threat is assessed as **Low**.

2.10.2 External – As threats have already been made, the external threat is evident.

The level of external threat is assessed as **High**.

2.10.3 Economic – The economic impact on the legal team could be considerable in the event witnesses and plaintiffs are threatened or coerced. The level of economic threat is assessed as **High**.

2.10.4 Criminal - The awareness to overall threat from hostile agents will continue to increase as the legal action continues. Because of the potential of this type of threat, further analysis should be conducted on an ongoing basis. A number of the potential scenarios currently under consideration involve the planting of illegal substances in hotel rooms or on a member of the legal or security team.

For hostile agents, whose ultimate goal is to discredit, injure or kill members of the legal team, any of these options would be effective. At this time, the criminal threat is assessed as **High**.